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Abstract
On 10 June 2019 the transposition and implementation deadline for the shareholder 
engagement rules imposed upon institutional investors and asset managers by the 
revised Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD II) expired. This article offers an original 
account of the rationale, the dynamics and the evolution of this EU-driven policy, 
which aims to promote long-term institutional shareholder engagement within (or in 
the absence of) nationally embedded frameworks. We place the SRD II shareholder 
engagement rules within what we see as a multi-layered regulatory landscape con-
sisting in some Member States of soft-law stewardship codes or similar principles 
and guidelines, and we find—perhaps surprisingly—that the SRD II stewardship-
related provisions were transposed in a literal and minimalistic fashion without any 
customization to divergent national specifications and despite the fact that the SRD 
II is only a minimum harmonization directive. We search for explanations for this 
transposition pattern by pointing to three key issues: the policy and institutional mis-
fit between the harmonized rules and national regimes, the lack of a strong market 
demand for shareholder stewardship, and the more apt soft, flexible and mostly bot-
tom-up norms (contained in codes or similar principles and guidelines)—rather than 
(semi-)hard top-down rules—in inculcating good shareholder stewardship practices. 
Against this background of minimalist intervention (both at the EU and national lev-
els), we find that pre-SRD II soft stewardship initiatives have had two key positive 
effects. First, they increased market actors’ familiarity and preparedness with the 
SRD II transposed rules, thereby increasing the likelihood of effective compliance 
with good shareholder stewardship standards whilst maintaining national idiosyn-
crasies. Second, soft-law stewardship codes or similar principles and guidelines, 
despite their own weaknesses, are vital mechanisms of innovative norm-generation 
and can expand or adjust the SRD II stewardship-related rules to provide tailored 
shareholder stewardship frameworks and serve as a signalling function for key mar-
ket actors. From this it follows that the uniform, but minimalistic, transposition of 
the SRD II stewardship-related rules across the EU, although welcome in shaping 
the minimum standards, needs to be supported by tailored, soft-law stewardship 
codes or similar principles and guidelines. Such a symbiosis of the harmonized SRD 
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II shareholder engagement rules and supporting soft-law stewardship developments 
will allow the tailoring of shareholder stewardship norms to local conditions and the 
provision of guidance and meaning to the SRD II rules, while a minimum harmoni-
zation of shareholder stewardship is already secured.
Keywords Revised shareholder rights directive · Institutional investors · Shareholder 
engagement · Shareholder stewardship · Minimum harmonization · Soft law
1 Introduction
‘We have learned the lessons from the past. With the revised Shareholder Rights 
Directive we pave the way to responsible investment and corporate decisions that 
have a longer time horizon, instead of focusing on short-term financial gain’, said 
Věra Jourová, Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, in June 
2019,1 three days before the expiry of the transposition deadline of the revised 
Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD II).2 In this article we deconstruct this state-
ment in light of the complexities of transforming the EU aspirations relating to the 
‘long-term’ and ‘responsible’ corporate governance role of institutional sharehold-
ers (asset owners and asset managers) to concrete and workable national shareholder 
engagement and broader shareholder stewardship practices. Similar to Katelouzou, 
we use the term ‘shareholder stewardship’ as broader than that of ‘shareholder 
engagement’.3 The former encompasses not only informal and formal shareholder 
engagement and the monitoring of investee companies (such as conducting a mean-
ingful dialogue with investee companies and exercising voting rights), but also 
related disclosure requirements imposed upon institutional investors and asset man-
agers, such as in relation to conflicts of interests.4
Previous contributions have already pointed out not only the rather fractional 
alignment between the ‘stewardship ideal’ and the business models of the invest-
ment fund industry,5 but also the enforcement weaknesses of current shareholder 
stewardship frameworks.6 What is less discussed, however, are the practical 
1 See European Commission, Daily News, 7 June 2019, https ://ec.europ a.eu/commi ssion /press corne r/
detai l/en/MEX_19_2913. Accessed 4 December 2019.
2 Directive 2017/828/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending 
Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement [2017] OJ L 
132/1. The SRD II transposition and implementation deadline expired on 10 June 2019, apart from Art. 
3a, 3b and 3c for which the Commission Implementing Regulation set the implementation deadline on 4 
September 2020. See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1212 of 3 September 2018 lay-
ing down minimum requirements implementing the provisions of Directive 2007/36/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards shareholder identification, the transmission of information and 
the facilitation of the exercise of shareholder rights [2018] OJ L 223/1.
3 This term is borrowed from Katelouzou (2021) who provides a comprehensive analysis of the broader 
concept of stewardship and its corporate governance as well as investment management aspects.
4 Ibid.
5 See Barker and Chiu (2017).
6 See Katelouzou and Sergakis (2020) who introduce an enforcement taxonomy for stewardship.
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challenges faced by legislators, public or quasi-public and private standard-setters, 
EU and national alike, in stirring institutional investors towards shareholder stew-
ardship policies and practices. This is due to the heterogeneous shareholder steward-
ship policies and engagement modes at the EU and national levels that create what 
can be described as a multi-layered regulatory shareholder stewardship landscape in 
Europe. This is what this article aims to elucidate and evaluate.
On the one hand, Article 3g of the SRD II juridifies certain aspects of share-
holder stewardship imposing requirements on institutional investors and asset man-
agers to develop and publish an engagement policy. The SRD II was issued to ensure 
minimum standards of shareholder engagement, as a ‘floor’ rather than a ‘ceiling’ 
upon which the Member States may set superior standards.7 Yet, on the other hand, 
we find that the SRD II stewardship-related provisions are ‘transposed’8 in a literal 
and minimalistic manner. While from an EU-compliance perspective this is not a 
major concern as a literal transposition appears to be in line with the wording and 
spirit of the directive, we question the lack of national deviations within the bounda-
ries allowed by the European Commission. In other words, we ask whether the lack 
of any ‘customization’9 within the scope of the discretion granted by the SRD II can 
be justified in light of pre-SRD II rules setting the shareholder stewardship frame-
work at the national level and the cross-country differences in market structures and 
cultural traditions. Two observations are made in this regard. First, in some Member 
States we find soft-law stewardship ‘codes’ (in the form of fully-fledged codes or 
preliminary initiatives and guidelines)10 that are more closely aligned with national 
specific (institutional or political) situations, traditions and existing laws. Such soft-
law stewardship codes along with other stewardship-related principles and guide-
lines found in corporate governance codes or investor associations’ codes of conduct 
can, in our opinion, offer a distinctive normative framework that will complement, 
rather than substitute, the SRD II stewardship-related rules and nudge market actors 
towards meaningful and tailored shareholder stewardship practices. This is due 
to the capacity of such soft-law shareholder stewardship developments to provide 
dynamic, flexible, innovative and tailored norm-generation and increase familiarity 
and compliance with the SRD II rules, attributes that make them particularly attrac-
tive to market actors and have the potential to boost ‘market demand’11 for share-
holder stewardship.
Our support for soft law in the area of shareholder stewardship may, at first 
glance, appear to be unusual and unsympathetic to the supporters of the Fullerian 
7 See also Katelouzou (2021).
8 In this article we look at the ‘formal’ transposition not the ‘implementation’ of SRD II. We therefore 
do not look at the practical implementation or monitoring of the SRD II transposed provisions by Mem-
ber States.
9 For the distinction between ‘customization’ and ‘non-compliance’ see Thomann (2015).
10 We use the term ‘code’ broadly in this study as encompassing both stewardship codes (that is the case 
in the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark) as well as preliminary initiatives (that is the case in Italy, Nor-
way, Switzerland). For the distinction between fully-fledged stewardship codes and preliminary steward-
ship initiatives, see Katelouzou and Siems (2021).
11 On the demand side of stewardship see Katelouzou and Micheler (2021).
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conception of EU law-making described as ‘one that sees the function of law as 
the provision of stable normative expectations’.12 Soft law, with its flexibility, vari-
ation and adaptability, has admittedly a low capacity for creating stable normative 
expectations. But, in our opinion, soft-law shareholder stewardship codes or simi-
lar principles and guidelines, despite their shortcomings, have already functioned 
as a normative—yet embryonic—‘laboratory’ offering educative and informational 
benefits to market actors as well as increasing familiarity with SRD II rules. The 
utility of such soft-law codes and principles/guidelines is even more significant in 
instances of the literal and minimalistic transposition of EU harmonized rules,13 as 
is the case with the SRD II stewardship-related rules. In such cases the normative 
gap created (in the absence of pre-existing national soft-law stewardship regimes) 
is considerable and market actors may not be gradually nudged towards meaningful 
shareholder stewardship; instead, they may risk perceiving the SRD II transposed 
rules as another compliance burden. With further harmonization in this area of law 
being unlikely,14 such a gap can only be bridged with the multiplication of soft-law 
stewardship frameworks by (quasi-)public regulators or private standard setters. 
Soft-law stewardship codes or similar principles and guidelines have already been 
successful mechanisms of innovative and customized norm-generation, expanding 
or adjusting the SRD II stewardship-related rules to specific legal, market or insti-
tutional (cultural) circumstances. Further, national regulators need to be mindful of 
the EU political drive for a quick fix of the shareholder engagement agenda within 
the investment chain and need to favour an organic growth of the ‘stewardship mar-
ket’,15 instead of aiming to serve formalistically the EU vision of long-term share-
holder engagement and stewardship through a literal and minimalistic transposition 
of the SRD II stewardship-related rules. Not only should soft-law rules relating to 
shareholder stewardship not be jettisoned after the transposition of SRD II, but also 
the multiplication of such initiatives in Member States with no pre-existing steward-
ship norms by (quasi-)public or private actors is both politically feasible and norma-
tively desirable.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out what can be 
described as a multifaceted shareholder stewardship landscape in the EU. We first 
examine the EU aspirations that shaped the shareholder engagement policy agenda 
on the basis of the general criticism of the investor-alleged acquiescence to serious 
corporate governance shortcomings that contributed to the global financial crisis, 
and the ensuing SRD II rules juridifying shareholder stewardship. We then examine 
some of the key pre-SRD II soft-law initiatives, in the form of stewardship codes or 
principles/guidelines, that have been nudging actors towards the adoption of sound 
12 Dawson (2009).
13 For an overview of the broader debate on EC-related implementation research in the area of social 
policy, see Falkner et al. (2005).
14 On the ‘fight’ over the EU Commission’s Draft Shareholder Rights Directive 2014, see Hopt (2015), 
pp 139-213. As a more general observation, the harmonisation of company law has never been an easy 
task. See, for instance, Cioffi (2002), p 355 (illustrating the politics of the long process of debating and 
amending the 13th Directive on Takeover Bids).
15 On the demand and supply side of this market see Katelouzou (2021).
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stewardship practices independently from EU aspirations. We proceed our analysis 
by shedding light on the legal, market and cultural specificities within which this 
emerging multifaceted shareholder stewardship regulatory framework is embedded.
Section 3 illustrates how Member States transposed the SRD II shareholder-stew-
ardship rules. Surprisingly, perhaps, we demonstrate a so far literal and minimalistic 
transposition of the SRD II rules irrespective of the pre-existence of national stew-
ardship codes. We explain this unexpected and seemingly counterintuitive finding 
in light of the following factors: the novelty and ensuing lack of familiarity with the 
shareholder stewardship obligations in Member States with no pre-SRD II norms 
(policy misfit), the lack of a local market demand for a tailored transposition, and 
the more apt soft, flexible and mostly bottom-up rules (rather than semi-hard top-
down rules) in inculcating good shareholder stewardship practices.
In Sect. 4 we expand this latter assertion and we argue that in the specific context 
of the SRD II the pre-existence of soft stewardship codes or similar principles and 
guidelines has had three additional positive effects. First, soft-law stewardship codes 
increased market actors’ familiarity with and preparedness for the SRD II transposed 
rules, thereby increasing the likelihood of effective compliance with good share-
holder stewardship standards whilst maintaining national idiosyncrasies. Second, 
soft-law codes serve a signalling function for other market actors, thereby increasing 
their legitimacy. Finally, soft-law stewardship codes are innovative norm-generat-
ing mechanisms and can expand or adjust the SRD II-related rules to provide tai-
lored shareholder stewardship frameworks. From this it follows that the uniform, but 
minimalistic, transposition of the SRD II stewardship-related rules across the EU, 
although welcome in shaping the minimum standards, needs to be supported by tai-
lored, soft-law stewardship codes or principles/guidelines. Such a symbiosis of the 
harmonized SRD II shareholder engagement rules and supporting soft-law steward-
ship developments will allow the customization of shareholder stewardship norms 
to local conditions and the provision of guidance and meaning to the SRD II rules, 
while a minimum harmonization of shareholder stewardship is already secured.
Section 5 concludes this article by reiterating the main claim for a multi-layered, 
symbiotic ‘regulatory space’16 for shareholder stewardship norms. The minimum 
standards introduced by the SRD II should be supported and advanced via soft-law 
shareholder stewardship norms. Such soft-law norms can be generated by differ-
ent standard-setters (public and quasi-public regulators and private standard setters, 
national and supranational alike) and through different channels (stewardship codes 
or principles and guidelines or any other related initiative included in corporate gov-
ernance codes, best practice standards or codes of conduct). In such a multi-layered 
regulatory space, shareholder stewardship norms—irrespective of their soft- or hard-
law nature and the form of responsibility they generate—should come together in a 
symbiotic and mutually supporting fashion to shape sound and meaningful share-
holder stewardship standards and practices.
16 Scott (2001a); Hancher and Moran (1989).
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2  The Regulatory Landscape of Shareholder Stewardship in Europe
2.1  The EU Aspirations: The Case of the SRD II
Shareholder rights have been a key focus of the EU corporate governance regulatory 
architecture from its inception.17 Following the global financial crisis in 2007–2008 
the case for a ‘shareholder democracy’18 energetically revived. Shareholder engage-
ment was positively brought forward as a sound corporate governance attribute and 
soon became one of the key buzzwords in the EU context, along with an emphasis 
on long termism, transparency and more recently sustainability. In 2014, the Euro-
pean Commission proposed amendments to the 2007 Shareholder Rights Directive 
(SRD I), aiming, among other things, at improving corporate governance through 
the promotion of effective and sustainable shareholder engagement and the improve-
ment of transparency along the investment chain.19 After various negotiations and 
consultations,20 the amended Directive (SRD II) was adopted in May 2017.
The SRD II recognizes that ‘effective and sustainable shareholder engagement 
is one of the cornerstones of the corporate governance model of listed companies, 
which depends on checks and balances between the different organs and different 
stakeholders’,21 and includes various measures with the aim of encouraging long-
term shareholder engagement, such as facilitating the transmission of cross-border 
information and shareholder voting,22 improving the level and quality of the engage-
ment of institutional investors and asset managers,23 enhancing the transparency of 
and shareholder influence on executive remuneration and related party transactions,24 
and ensuring the reliability and quality of proxy advisers’ recommendations.25 Even 
though the term ‘stewardship’ is used only once in the SRD II, the engagement and 
disclosure obligations imposed under Article 3g are along lines that are similar to 
those in pre-existing national stewardship codes.26 Under Article 3g institutional 
17 See European Commission, ‘Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan’, Brus-
sels, 11 May 1999, COM(1999) 232 final.
18 European Commission, ‘Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the 
European Union—A Plan to Move Forwards in Brussels’, 21 May 2003, COM(2003) 284 final.
19 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/
EC as regards the encouragement of long long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU 
as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement (SWD(2014) 126,127,128 final) pub-
lished 9 April 2014.
20 See specifically the Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 8 July 2015 on the proposal 
for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards 
the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain 
elements of the corporate governance statement, COM(2014)0213—C7-0147/2014—2014/0121(COD).
21 SRD II, Recital 14.
22 SRD II, Arts. 3a-3d.
23 SRD II, Arts. 3g-3k.
24 SRD II, Arts. 9a-9c.
25 SRD II, Art. 3j.
26 SRD II, Recital 19: ‘A medium to long-term approach is a key enable of responsible stewardship of 
assets’. See also European Commission, MEMO, ‘Action Plan on European company law and corporate 
governance: Frequently Asked Questions’, 12 December 2012, https ://ec.europ a.eu/commi ssion /press 
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investors (defined as insurance companies and pension funds)27 and asset managers28 
are expected to develop an engagement policy, which would describe, among other 
things, how shareholder engagement is integrated in their investment strategy, how 
the financial and non-financial performance of investee companies are monitored, 
how dialogue is conducted, how voting rights are exercised, how other shareholders 
or stakeholders have been engaged and how actual and potential conflicts of inter-
ests are managed.29 This engagement policy along with its implementation need to be 
annually disclosed.30 The requirements relating to the establishment and disclosure of 
an engagement policy operate on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis.31 The degree of flex-
ibility offered by the ‘comply-or-explain’ principle is considerable and not uncom-
mon in EU company law and corporate governance.32 Such ‘opt-outs’,33 despite their 
32 See, for example, Art. 46a of the 4th company law Directive 2006/46/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 14 June 2006 amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of 
certain types of companies, 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts, 86/635/EEC on the annual accounts 
and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial institutions and 91/674/EEC on the annual 
accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance undertakings [2006] OJ L 224/1; Art. 20(1) of Directive 
2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial state-
ments, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending 
Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 
78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC [2013] OJ L 182/19. Both Directives adopt the ‘comply-or-explain’ princi-
ple for corporate governance statements of listed companies, allowing for different company law frame-
works and governance systems to co-exist harmoniously while allowing for information to be disclosed 
across the EU.
33 For the general debate on optional versus mandatory EU company law, see Hertig and McCahery 
(2006), pp 341–362.
corne r/detai l/en/MEMO_12_972) where the European Commission uses the term stewardship as synony-
mous to shareholder engagement. Accessed 4 December 2019.
Footnote 26 (continued)
27 Pursuant to Art.1(2)(e) of the 2017 SRD, an institutional investor denotes ‘(i) an undertaking carrying 
out activities of life assurance within the meaning of points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 2(3) of Directive 
2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, and of reinsurance as defined in point (7) 
of Article 13 of that Directive provided that those activities cover life-insurance obligations, and which 
is not excluded pursuant to that Directive; (ii) an institution for occupational retirement provision falling 
within the scope of Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council in accord-
ance with Article 2 thereof, unless a Member State has chosen not to apply that Directive in whole or in 
parts to that institution in accordance with Article 5 of that Directive’.
28 As defined in Art. 1(2)(f) of the 2017 SRD: ‘an investment firm as defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) 
of Directive 2014/65/EU that provides portfolio management services to investors, an AIFM (alternative 
investment fund manager) as defined in point (b) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2011/61/EU that does not 
fulfil the conditions for an exemption in accordance with Article 3 of that Directive or a management 
company as defined in point (b) of Article 2(1) of Directive 2009/65/EC, or an investment company that 
is authorised in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC provided that it has not designated a management 
company authorised under that Directive for its management’.
29 SRD II, Art. 3g(1)(a).
30 SRD II, Art. 3g(1)(b). Additionally, institutional investors and asset managers are expected under 
Arts. 3h and 3i to disclose annually their investment strategies (including how their investment strat-
egy contributes to the medium to long-term performance of their assets) and their arrangements with 
each other. Even though these articles support shareholder engagement and shareholder stewardship, they 
relate to investment management aspects and therefore remain outside the scope of this study. Further on 
the investment management side of stewardship, see Katelouzou (2021).
31 SRD II, Art. 3g(1).
210 D. Katelouzou, K. Sergakis 
123
‘softening’ effect on EU law-making, decrease the risks of inefficient deadlocks and 
‘one size fits all’ approaches that simply equalize standards ‘from above’. Yet, the 
SRD II is not far from imposing a ‘duty to demonstrate engagement’34 on grounds of 
public interest relating to sustainable, long-term shareholder behaviour.35 Although 
this is not an expressly defined duty, the disclosure obligations imposed upon insti-
tutional investors and asset managers under Article 3g compel that certain insti-
tutional shareholder engagement needs to be undertaken. This is arguably a move 
towards ‘hardening’36 shareholder stewardship norms in contrast to national steward-
ship codes and principles which mainly treat shareholder stewardship as a voluntary 
practice.37
But why did the EU regulators become increasingly focused on promoting share-
holder engagement, especially on the part of institutional investors and asset manag-
ers? The politics of EU corporate governance regulation are well discussed. Laura 
Horn has forcefully pointed out that the primacy of shareholder rights found in the 
EU corporate governance regulation is not only a legal but also a political device.38 
The EU emphasis on strengthening the rights of shareholders has been part of a 
broader movement from harmonization to marketization, cross-listings and the rais-
ing of capital and from industrial to shareholder democracy.39 But following the 
financial crisis of 2007-8 an important shift has begun to make inroads in the EU 
corporate governance regulation, a shift that has elsewhere been termed as a ‘modi-
fied, sustainable, version of shareholder primacy’. SRD II is clearly a part of this 
movement.40
The impetus of this reform was driven by strong criticism of the way institutional 
investors have undertaken their corporate governance roles over the years preceding 
and following the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 and of the general priority 
that has been given to them by policymakers compared to other corporate actors and 
wider stakeholders. Among the key claims that have been put forward is that invest-
ment management has largely supported or acquiesced to a short-term focus and has 
pressured executives to focus on current earnings, especially in financial institutions, 
at the expense of financial stability and long-term sustainability.41 The post-financial 
34 On the hardening of stewardship norms, see further Chiu and Katelouzou (2017), p 131.
35 For an overview of the growing public interest in stewardship codes, see Katelouzou (2019a), pp 581–
595.
36 Chiu and Katelouzou (2017). This hardening of stewardship norms is likely to be reinforced by the 
proposed disclosure obligations aiming to integrate environment, social and governance (ESG) consid-
erations into the decision-making processes of institutional investors and asset managers. See European 
Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on disclosures 
relating to sustainable investments and sustainability risks and amending Directive (EU) 2016/2341, 
COM(2018) 354 final.
37 See Sect. 2.2 below.
38 Horn (2011).
39 Ibid.
40 For the regulatory transformation of shareholder rights and engagement in the EU, see, further, Kate-
louzou (2019b).
41 See European Commission, ‘Green Paper: Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remu-
neration Policies’, Brussels, 2 June 2010, COM(2010) 284 final; European Commission, ‘Green Paper: 
The EU Corporate Governance Framework’, Brussels, 5 April 2011, COM(2011) 164 final.
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crisis environment also revealed the loss of investment incurred by ultimate ben-
eficiaries—future retirees and long-term individual savers—rendering investment 
management a highly sensitive issue in the eyes of governments.42 The EU political 
stance on the agenda of long-term shareholder engagement has been clear since its 
inception: in a ‘capital market regulation’ facet,43 the SRD II imposes a top-down 
premise that nudging institutional investors and asset managers toward shareholder 
engagement and introducing greater disclosure requirements along the investment 
chain will generate sustainable shareholder value.44 This stance is a clear manifesta-
tion that the ‘absentee landlord’45 modus operandi can no longer be accepted as the 
default policy approach. But more importantly, as Katelouzou points out, the SRD 
II is moving away from an exclusive focus on shareholder primacy and the popular 
agency theory jargon towards a modified, enlightened, version of shareholder pri-
macy and a sustainability lexicon.46
The role of the European Parliament has been instrumental in this regard. In 
July 2015 the European Parliament amended the original European Commission’s 
SRD II proposal adding the reduction of social and environmental risks as key com-
ponents of the engagement policy, compelling institutional investors to take into 
account and cooperate with stakeholders when engaging with investee companies, 
and ‘socialising’ the transparency requirements across the investment chain.47 These 
changes reflect the public interest in making institutional shareholders accountable 
to their clients, other market actors, investee companies and society at large.48 More 
recently shareholder stewardship has been placed as one of the key building blocks 
for an EU sustainable finance strategy.49 In the transition to a sustainable economy, 
institutional investors have an important stewardship role to play to manage com-
pany-specific risks, promote long-term performance and achieve sustainability in 
investment.50
42 On the impact of this change to ‘the politically contested modification of institutional investors’, see 
Kallifatides and Nachemson-Ekwall (2016), pp 278–294.
43 For a critical approach, see Pacces (2018), p 523.
44 SRD II, Recitals 14–23.
45 Myners (2009), para. 38.
46 Katelouzou (2019b).
47 Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 8 July 2015 on the proposal for a directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encour-
agement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain ele-
ments of the corporate governance statement (COM(2014)0213—C7-0147/2014—2014/0121(COD)), 
https ://www.europ arl.europ a.eu/sides /getDo c.do?pubRe f=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-
0257+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. Accessed 4 December 2019.
48 Chiu and Katelouzou (2017); Katelouzou (2019a).
49 European Commission, ‘Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth’, Brussels, 8 March 2018, 
COM(2018) 97 final, https ://eur-lex.europ a.eu/legal -conte nt/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX :52018 
DC009 7&from=EN. Accessed 4 December 2019.
50 Further on how stewardship can support sustainable finance, see Katelouzou and Klettner (2021).
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However, the chances of institutional shareholders serving successfully all the 
above-mentioned interests51 or that disclosure obligations will generate—on their 
own—long-term shareholder engagement52 being less than certain and outside the 
scope of this article, leaves the current SRD II rules in a ‘conceptual limbo’. By 
attempting to inculcate an ‘investor paradigm’ shift,53 merging private and public 
aspects of the corporate governance role of institutional investors and their invest-
ment management, the SRD II becomes a normative source in open competition—
in terms of persuasiveness and attractiveness—with pre-existing, national soft-law 
instruments, such as stewardship codes or principles, to which we now turn.
2.2  The National Aspirations: The Case of National Stewardship Codes
The shareholder stewardship provisions of the SRD II did not arrive in a norma-
tive gap. Rather, they added to a high-profile, pre-existing record of national stand-
ards for shareholder stewardship.54 Within Europe, four EU Member States, i.e. 
the UK,55 the Netherlands,56 Italy57 and Denmark,58 as well as Switzerland59 and 
Norway60 had introduced measures to increase the level and quality of institutional 
shareholders’ engagement with investee companies and to facilitate a shareholder 
51 For a critical approach, see also Chiu (2019), p 126 (stating that ‘the merging of “private shareholder 
conduct” with the expectations of institutions as socially-representative investors has created an ambiva-
lent issue area whose nature remains unresolved’).
52 Birkmose (2014).
53 Katelouzou (2017), p 140.
54 Currently stewardship codes or similar principles-based frameworks exist in twenty countries around 
the world. For a textual comparative analysis of stewardship codes, see Katelouzou and Siems (2021).
55 The first stewardship code was introduced by the UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in 2010 and 
it was revised in 2012 and again in 2019. For the most recent version see Financial Reporting Council, 
The UK Stewardship Code 2020, https ://www.frc.org.uk/getat tachm ent/5aae5 91d-d9d3-4cf4-814a-d14e1 
56a1d 87/Stewa rdshi p-Code_Final 2.pdf. Accessed 4 December 2019.
56 In the Netherlands, a stewardship code was introduced in 2018 by Eumedion, an institutional inves-
tors’ forum, to replace the 2011 Eumedion 10 Best Principles for Engaged Share-Ownership. See, fur-
ther, the Dutch Stewardship Code (20 June 2018), https ://www.eumed ion.nl/en/publi c/knowl edgen etwor 
k/best-pract ices/2018-07-dutch -stewa rdshi p-code-final -versi on.pdf. Accessed 4 December 2019.
57 In Italy, Assogestioni, an association of asset managers, adopted stewardship principles in 2013 and 
revised them in 2015 and 2016. For the latest version of the principles, see Assogestioni, Italian Stew-
ardship Principles for the exercise of administrative and voting rights in listed companies (2016), https 
://www.assog estio ni.it/sites /defau lt/files /docs/princ ipi_ita_stewa rdshi p0720 19.pdf. Accessed 4 December 
2019.
58 See the Danish Committee on Corporate Governance, Stewardship Code (November 2016), https ://
corpo rateg overn ance.dk/sites /defau lt/files /18011 6_stewa rdshi p_code.pdf. Accessed 4 December 2019.
59 In Switzerland, in 2013 Economiesuisse (a Swiss NGO representing the interests of the Swiss busi-
ness community), associations of institutional investors, proxy advisers and regulatory authorities joined 
forces and published the ‘Guidelines for institutional investors governing the exercising of participation 
rights in public limited companies’, https ://swiss inves torsc ode.ch/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2013/06/Richt linie 
n_16012 013_e.pdf. Accessed 4 December 2019.
60 The Norwegian stewardship principles introduced by the Norwegian Fund and Asset Management 
Association in 2003 and revised in 2012 are available (in Norwegian) at https ://vff.no/asset s/Brans jenor 
mer/Brans jeanb efali nger/Brans jeanb efali ng-ut%C3%B8vel se-av-eiers kap.pdf. Accessed 4 December 
2019.
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stewardship orientation among institutional investors, before the introduction of the 
SRD II.
These national stewardship codes originate from different issuers. In the UK 
and Denmark, the codes emanate from quasi-regulators, the Financial Reporting 
Council and the Danish Committee on Corporate Governance, respectively.61 The 
Swiss code has been a joint effort by private and public actors,62 whilst in Italy, The 
Netherlands, and Norway the stewardship codes are investor-led. This difference in 
authorship has some impact on the content and scope of the stewardship codes.63 
The 2012 version of the UK Stewardship Code contains seven key principles rang-
ing from the development and disclosure of an engagement policy to monitoring the 
investee companies and being prepared to escalate any stewardship activities, and 
from acting collectively with other investors where appropriate and exercising vot-
ing rights to disclosing voting policy and behaviour, avoiding conflicts of interests 
and reporting to beneficiaries.64 The 2012 UK code was overhauled in 2019 follow-
ing serious criticism directed at the practicalities of exercising stewardship, includ-
ing the questionable abilities and capacities of institutional investors and the exten-
sive focus of the 2012 version on stewardship policies rather than on outcomes.65 
The new 2020 UK code comprises twelve principles for asset owners66 and asset 
managers and six separate principles for service providers, including investment.67 
The new stewardship principles are supported by reporting expectations which 
sometimes differ according to whether those applying the code are investing directly 
or indirectly.68
Despite its overhaul, the 2012 version of the UK code has left its mark firmly 
upon stewardship codes around the world.69 In Europe, the Danish Stewardship 
Code contains the same seven stewardship principles as its UK 2012 counterpart.70 
From the investor-led codes, the Dutch code incorporates the same seven steward-
ship principles as the UK and Danish codes with the addition of principles relating 
61 But one should note that the UK Stewardship Code emanates from the Code on the Responsibilities of 
Institutional Investors, issued by the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (ISC). For the history of the 
UK code, see Katelouzou (2021).
62 The Swiss code has been published by Economiesuisse, the Government (Swiss Federal Office for 
Social Security), the Association of Swiss Pension Fund Providers, the Swiss Bankers Association and 
Ethos (the Swiss foundation for Sustainable Development).
63 See Katelouzou and Siems (2021) studying 41 stewardship codes and providing some empirical evi-
dence that the nature of the issuer has an impact on the incorporation of some of the stewardship princi-
ples.
64 UK Stewardship Code 2012.
65 For a comprehensive analysis of the new code, see Katelouzou (2021).
66 The term ‘asset owners’ found in national stewardship codes is broadly similar to the term ‘institu-
tional investors’ used by the SRD II.
67 Katelouzou (2021).
68 Ibid.
69 For empirical evidence on the diffusion of the UK stewardship principles across the world see Kate-
louzou and Siems (2021).
70 This similarity in the content may be explained by the fact that both the UK and Danish codes have 
been issued by quasi-regulators. For a comprehensive comparison between the UK and Danish codes, see 
Birkmose and Madsen (2021).
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to: (1) communication with other stakeholders where appropriate,71 (2) the need to 
consult the investee company before exercising the shareholder rights to submit a 
request for convening an extraordinary general meeting or put an item on the agenda 
of a general meeting,72 and (3) abstaining from voting in case of short positions and 
recalling share lending before voting.73 The Italian code consists of six principles 
which closely resemble the key aspects of its UK counterpart,74 but it incorporates 
elements that are strictly related to the Italian regulatory framework, including the 
slate voting system for the election of the management and supervisory board mem-
bers and behind-the-doors dialogues.75
Both the Norwegian and Swiss codes are more a type of a ‘preliminary stew-
ardship initiative’ than a proper stewardship code.76 The Norwegian code is prob-
ably the most ‘alien’ of the investor-led codes as it solely focuses on the investment 
management aspects of stewardship incorporating selected references to the 2011 
EFAMA’s (European Fund and Asset Management Association’s) ‘code for external 
governance’77 and Norwegian investment law (mostly related to securities funds).78 
Finally, the Swiss code—despite its multiple issuers—is also limited in its content 
having its main focus on the exercise of voting rights by institutional investors. The 
Swiss code repeatedly refers to the interests of the clients (the ultimate beneficiar-
ies) of institutional investors rather than responsible shareholding and has, there-
fore, been characterised as a ‘watered-down’ version of the 2012 version of the UK 
code.79
Finally, in terms of their scope, the UK (2012), Danish, Dutch and Swiss codes 
apply to both asset owners and asset managers, while the Italian and Norwegian 
codes are aimed at asset managers. The limited scope of the Italian and Norwegian 
codes reflects the nature of the issuer which in both cases is an association of asset 
managers. On the other hand, the UK 2020 code has the widest scope comprising of 
principles not only for asset owners and asset manager but also for service providers.
Even though the national stewardship codes exhibit differences in authorship, 
scope and content, all but the Swiss code80 use the term ‘stewardship’ to encompass 
71 Dutch Code, Principle 5.
72 Dutch Code, Principles 9 and 10.
73 Dutch Code, Principle 11.
74 Note that in the Italian code the principles of engagement and escalation are incorporated in a single 
principle (Principle 4).
75 Strampelli (2021).
76 Katelouzou and Siems (2021).
77 EFAMA, ‘Code for External Governance: Principles for the Exercise of Ownership Rights in Investee 
Companies’, Brussels, 6 April 2011, https ://www.efama .org/Publi catio ns/Publi c/Corpo rate_Gover nance 
/11-4035%20EFA MA%20ECG _final _6%20Apr il%20201 1%20v2.pdf. Accessed 4 April 2020.
78 Mähönen et  al. (2021). Due to its limited content, the Norwegian code has been characterised as a 
preliminary initiative rather than a code. See Katelouzou and Siems (2021).
79 Daeniker and Hertig (2021).
80 Even though the Swiss code—being a preliminary initiative—does not use the term ‘stewardship’, 
its principles resemble many of the shareholder stewardship principles found in other codes (especially 
in relation to voting and disclosure). For cross-country differences in the principles of the stewardship 
codes, see Katelouzou and Siems (2021).
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the vision of the long-term institutional investor which is capable and willing to 
monitor the management of investee companies with the aim of promoting long-
term value, whilst at the same time acting as a steward to safeguard the interests 
of its own beneficiaries and the economy as a whole. This ‘stewardship ideal’, also 
termed as an ‘investor paradigm’ for corporate law and corporate governance regu-
lation,81 attempts to construe what appears to be an irreconcilable tension between 
value-enhancing shareholder engagement in corporate affairs aiming at improv-
ing corporate performance and portfolio returns for the end-investors, on the one 
hand, and accountability to a variety of constituents, ranging from end-investors to 
investee companies’ shareholders and wider stakeholders, on the other hand, such as 
employees, creditors or environment, with the overall aim being the furtherance of 
aggregate social welfare. While the weight placed on the need to enhance account-
ability across the investment chain varies widely across the national stewardship 
codes,82 this tension between value-enhancing monitoring and accountability has 
been manifested in different ways across different asset owners and asset managers 
and different countries.83 But a common feature of all national stewardship codes is 
their soft, non-binding nature. Most of them are either completely voluntary (as in 
the case of the Norwegian and Swiss codes) or incorporate an expectation that the 
comply-or-explain approach will be followed on a voluntary basis (as in the case of 
the Danish, Dutch and Italian codes). Only the UK code has some coerciveness, as 
the apply-and-explain (comply or explain) approach of the UK 2020 (2012) code is 
mandatory for FCA-authorized asset managers.84
Overall, national stewardship codes and similar initiatives have managed, not-
withstanding their soft, non-binding nature and other limitations relating to their 
narrow, national scope,85 to attract a substantial amount of market attention, espe-
cially among asset managers,86 and to trigger awareness of the need for responsi-
ble ownership within the investment chain. Sometimes these codes have been influ-
enced by supranational developments, as is the case with the Italian and Norwegian 
codes which have been largely drafted on the basis of the EFAMA code.87 How-
ever, within this wider regulatory network of national and supranational stewardship 
soft-law norms, it needs to be acknowledged that the stewardship codes are part of 
broader national frameworks shaped within legal, market and cultural specificities.
81 Katelouzou (2017).
82 Compare, for instance, in this regard the UK 2020 code and the Swiss code.
83 See e.g. Klettner (2017).
84 Further on the enforcement parameters of stewardship codes, see Katelouzou and Sergakis (2020).
85 For a critical approach to stewardship codes, see, among others, Cheffins (2010); Reisberg (2015).
86 Asset owners have been slower to embrace stewardship due to their business models. See, for 
instance, FRC/FCA (2019), p 25 (pointing out that ‘while 68% of asset owners have a stated policy on 
stewardship, only 37% set out their stewardship expectations in the mandates they give asset managers’).
87 See further Katelouzou and Siems (2021).
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2.3  The Broader National Stewardship Frameworks: Legal, Market and Cultural 
Specificities
National shareholder stewardship frameworks are dependent on various national 
legal traits, including company law rules and investment management require-
ments (such as fiduciary duties) facilitating or impeding stewardship.88 National 
stewardship codes have been developed within well-established corporate govern-
ance frameworks and sometimes they specifically refer to national corporate gov-
ernance codes as ‘complementary counterparts’ noting that shareholder stewardship 
can give force to the ‘comply or explain’ system upon which corporate reporting is 
based.89 In addition, shareholder stewardship interfaces with the position of institu-
tional shareholders as minority shareholders. Company law rules are, therefore, a 
decisive factor that can facilitate or impede shareholder stewardship practices. Rules 
relating to shareholder voting rights and the conduct of annual general meetings, 
for instance, have been discussed extensively in the previous literature and many 
authors have pointed to the impact of such rules on shareholder engagement and 
shareholder activism.90 In the EU, shareholder protection has been at the top of the 
policy agenda since the 2003 Action Plan91 and following the enactment of the SRD 
I many procedural aspects of exercising shareholder rights have been harmonized.92 
But the SRD I has been criticised as falling short of harnessing the full potential 
of shareholder engagement,93 and there is still ample room for the preservation of 
national legal traits that may impede or promote shareholder engagement and stew-
ardship orientation.94 For instance, in Germany section 54 of the Aktiengesetz (the 
German Corporation Act) allows shareholders to remain passive. Yet, it is debat-
able whether this ‘right to remain passive’ prohibits shareholder engagement.95 On 
other occasions, country-specific legal nuances may promote shareholder steward-
ship as is the case with the shareholder right to appoint minority directors and statu-
tory auditors in Italy. Indeed, Strampelli has argued that minority directors are often 
appointed by collective engagement activities supported by Assogestioni, the issuer 
of the Italian stewardship code. These minority rights therefore play a key role in 
88 On how law impacts the demand and supply side of the stewardship market, see Katelouzou (2021).
89 This is, for instance, the case with the UK Stewardship Code 2012 which states: ‘The UK Corporate 
Governance Code identifies the principles that underlie an effective board. The UK Stewardship Code 
sets out the principles of effective stewardship by investors. In so doing, the Code assists institutional 
investors better to exercise their stewardship responsibilities, which in turn gives force to the “comply 
or explain” system’ (p 1). For a detailed analysis of this broader stewardship framework in the UK, see 
Katelouzou (2021).
90 See e.g. Van der Elst (2010); Katelouzou (2015), pp 819–826.
91 European Commission, ‘Action Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Gov-
ernance—A Plan to Move Forward’, COM(2003) 284.
92 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards 
the encouragement of long long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards cer-
tain elements of the corporate governance statement [SWD(2014) 126,127,128 final].
93 E.g. Masouros (2010).
94 See e.g. Inci (2017), pp 145–146.
95 Ringe (2020).
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fostering the involvement of institutional shareholders in the corporate governance 
affairs of publicly listed companies in Italy.96
While both the nature and success of shareholder engagement depend decisively 
on shareholder rights, stewardship also has an important investment management 
aspect.97 The realisation of the envisaged stewardship role by institutional investors 
largely depends on the nature and character of investment management. Regulation 
plays a contributory part in shaping the incentives of institutional investors and asset 
managers to engage in stewardship activities. Çelik and Isaksoon have suggested, in 
a research paper for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), that the ‘business model’ of different institutional investors has an impact 
on the character and degree of shareholder engagement,98 and Chiu and Barker have 
examined the impact of regulatory obligations imposed on UK pension funds and 
retail collective investment schemes that impede engaged ownership.99 The Norwe-
gian Stewardship Code, for instance, concentrates its focus on securities fund man-
agement companies and makes direct references to Norwegian legal specifications, 
such as the Norwegian Act on Securities Funds and the Securities Funds Regula-
tion.100 While more research is still required on the investment management aspects 
of stewardship both at the national and supranational level,101 EU legislation has 
already addressed some general regulatory aspects of investment management.102 
But despite these efforts, serious concerns still remain in relation to the asset manag-
ers’ regulatory duties and their overall compliance stance. For instance, EFAMA has 
already evoked the lack of knowledge in respect of ‘many country-specific nuances’ 
and the difficulty that asset managers have in complying with national provisions.103 
Finally, as the concept of shareholder stewardship is deeply intertwined with sus-
tainability concerns, the way in which the sustainable behaviour of both companies 
96 Strampelli (2021).
97 For the distinction between the corporate governance and investment management aspects of steward-
ship see Katelouzou (2019a) and (2021).
98 Çelik and Isaksson (2013), pp 93–114.
99 Barker and Chiu (2017).
100 Mähönen et al. (2021).
101 For such research in the UK context, see Katelouzou (2021).
102 See e.g. Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collec-
tive investment in transferable securities (UCITS) [2009] OJ L 302/32, Arts. 7, 68, 69 and 73; Direc-
tive 2010/43/EU of 1 July 2010 implementing Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council as regards organisational requirements, conflicts of interests, conduct of business, risk man-
agement and content of the agreement between a depositary and a management company [2010] OJ L 
176/42, Arts. 13, 17–18 and 20–23; Directive 2001/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directive 2003/41/EC and 
2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No. 1060/2009 and (EU) No. 1095/2010 [2019] OJ L 174/1, Arts. 9, 
12, 22-24; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 231/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing 
Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to exemptions, general 
operating conditions, depositaries, leverage, transparency and supervision [2012] OJ L 83/1.
103 See EFAMA, ‘Towards Capital Markets’ Long-Termism: Revised Shareholder Rights Direc-
tive’, Brussels, 7 June 2019, https ://www.efama .org/Pages /Submi tted%20aft er%20201 8-03-12T16 
%2022%2007/Towar ds-capit al-marke ts’-long-termi sm---revis ed-share holde r-right s-direc tive.aspx. 
Accessed 4 December 2019.
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and investors is regulated can potentially have an impact on stewardship activities.104 
Here the differences across Member States are substantial,105 but the EU is mak-
ing significant steps to harmonize the non-financial reporting requirements for both 
companies and investors and to expand directors’ and investors’ duties to account for 
ESG factors.106
Market infrastructure also becomes critical for shareholder stewardship. Leav-
ing aside the structures and incentives of the fund management industry,107 the 
ownership structure of investee companies can affect the likelihood and success of 
shareholder stewardship practices and it would therefore be utopic to anticipate the 
accomplishment of the generic SRD II objectives at the national level in a uniform 
way. Member States vary significantly in the ownership concentration and types of 
shareholders at the company level.108 Previous literature has elaborated how dif-
ferent ownership structures impact engagement practices and shareholder activ-
ism more generally.109 For instance, in countries with dispersed ownership, such as 
the UK, shareholder engagement and more aggressive forms of shareholder activ-
ism (expressed by both traditional and alternative institutional investors) is a much 
more frequent phenomenon.110 On the other hand, in countries with concentrated 
ownership, such as Germany and Italy, such activism, while initially not devel-
oped due to the presence of opposing controlling shareholders, now becomes more 
and more notable.111 Lastly, in the latter category, we also find countries, such as 
Sweden and Finland, whose predominantly controlling shareholders also impede 
shareholder engagement.112 But the general rise of institutional investors in Euro-
pean equity markets, even where controlled companies are still predominant, cre-
ates enabling conditions for the development of shareholder stewardship.113 Another 
key market parameter for shareholder stewardship, as Katelouzou points out, is the 
substantial differences in pension systems across Europe and the varying emphasis 
on state-funded pension schemes. The shift from defined benefit to defined contri-
bution arrangements in countries like the UK had a dramatic impact on the direct 
104 Katelouzou (2019a).
105 See e.g. the European Commission Impact Assessment of 24 May 2019 SWD(2018) 264 (final), 
24–25 and 153–157 (overviewing the cross-country differences on ESG disclosure requirements).
106 European Commission, ‘Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth; Proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on disclosures relating to sustainable investments and sustain-
ability risks and amending Directive (EU) 2016/2341’ (2018), COM/2018/354 final.
107 On this see Barker and Chiu (2017).
108 For recent data, see De La Cruz et al. (2019).
109 See e.g. Van der Elst (2010), p 57; Katelouzou (2015).
110 See e.g. Katelouzou (2013); Fichtner (2015).
111 See e.g. Ringe (2015), p 429. There is, however, a variation in these countries. In Germany, share-
holder activism in general and hedge fund activism specifically has flourished in recent years due to the 
growing dispersion in the ownership structure. But in Italy, hedge fund activism has flourished due to 
strong minority shareholder rights even though concentrated ownership structures do persist. On the dif-
ferent triggering factors, see Erede (2013).
112 For an overview of these and other (non-EU) countries, see Fenwick and Vermeulen (2018).
113 Chiu and Katelouzou (2017), p 133.
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allocations by pension funds to equities. This in turn has a negative effect on the 
demand for shareholder stewardship from pension funds.114
Finally, the overall institutional context,115 including cultural specificities, can 
play a decisive role in the development of good shareholder stewardship practices. 
Licht’s analysis of cultural distance and ‘foreignness’116 deserves specific attention 
here. Indeed, corporate governance characteristics are related to value emphases 
and cognitive elements attached to national frameworks.117 This also explains the 
resistance of some frameworks to adapt to changes, perpetuating their own cultural 
values over time.118 In the case of shareholder stewardship, a cultural aversion to 
shareholder engagement in corporate affairs is noticeable among Member States that 
share a network-oriented or stakeholder-oriented corporate governance tradition, 
often associated with the cultural dimensions of egalitarianism, the ideal of a volun-
tary commitment to promoting the welfare of others.119 The role of national élites in 
resisting any exogenous modification of traditional norms or rules that may under-
mine their own position is also important here.120 Indeed, in some countries such as 
France, institutional investors and asset managers are seen as a potential threat to the 
corporate establishment when actively engaging with their investee companies.121 
Additionally, the ‘proper’ tools of shareholder engagement are perceived differently 
across the EU, depicting cultural preferences in terms of communication routes.122
To conclude this section, for shareholder stewardship, like any other legal norms, 
to operate as designed there must exist a widely shared social norm of steward-
ship abidingness. At the same time, shareholder stewardship norms and rules are 
shaped and exercised differently in different national contexts depending upon legal 
nuances, market structures, cultural traditions and other contingent factors. Without 
such supporting social norms and local institutions, shareholder stewardship cannot 
114 See further Katelouzou (2021).
115 On the embeddedness of corporate governance in different social contexts, see e.g. Granovetter 
(1985).
116 Licht (2004).
117 Ibid., p 198. On the importance of culture and ideology in influencing a country’s choice of a corpo-
rate legal system, see Bebchuk and Roe (1999), p 168. On the difficulty in achieving a commonly shared 
view of corporations in Europe (that also indirectly influences, in our view, the perception and meaning-
ful adoption of stewardship norms) see Wymeersch (2002), p 230; Davies and Hopt (2013).
118 Inglehart and Baker (2000). Hermes also denotes a striking lack of preparedness in relation to the 
SRD II rules at the national level, an assertion that shows the persisting barriers to the gradual accept-
ance of stewardship norms and to the need for a gradual absorption of the ‘top-down’ regulation: Hermes 
(2019).
119 Further on how egalitarianism affects corporate governance and investment, see Siegel, Licht and 
Schwartz (2011). For empirical evidence linking culture to corporate governance systems, see Breuer 
and Salzmann (2012).
120 For the roles of élites in cultural reproduction which generate social continuity without entirely 
impeding corporate governance reform, see Maclean, Harvey and Press (2006).
121 See for example the recent Woerth Report in France criticising shareholder activism: https ://www.
assem blee-natio nale.fr/15/rap-info/i2287 .asp. Accessed 22 February 2020.
122 For instance, in the UK behind the scenes negotiations seem to be the preferred method of investors’ 
engagement with companies. See further Becht et al. (2009).
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operate effectively especially when it is imported in a top-down fashion as is the 
case with the transposed SRD II stewardship-related rules.
3  National Transposition Trends: A Puzzle in Search 
of an Explanation
3.1  A Literal and Minimalistic Transposition
As mentioned above, the SRD II is a minimum harmonization directive which aims 
to create a common framework whilst leaving room for divergent national specifica-
tion.123 Although lower standards of shareholder engagement and associated disclo-
sures are not allowed, Member States can introduce higher standards of shareholder 
stewardship and customize the EU rules according to local circumstances.124 In most 
cases, however, Member States have largely copied Article 3g of SRD II without 
adapting the EU policy to domestic circumstances.125 Representative examples of 
such a literal and minimalistic transposition can be found in Germany,126 Greece,127 
Luxembourg,128 Portugal,129 Sweden,130 and Spain.131 Belgium has also been a 
123 See Sect. 2.1 above.
124 Earlier Europeanization research refers to situations where Member States implement EU law in a 
non-literal way—e.g. Steunenberg (2007)—or go beyond minimum requirements as ‘over-implementa-
tion’ or ‘gold-plating’—e.g. Falkner et al. (2005). More recent studies explore ‘customization’ along two 
dimensions, i.e. density and restrictiveness. See Thomann and Zhelyazkova (2017).
125 Despite the expiry of the transposition deadline of 10 June 2019, not all Member States have trans-
posed Art. 3g. For example, Greece transposed all of the SRD II rules by 10 June 2019, except for the 
provisions related to disclosure and engagement duties (Art. 3g-3i) that only became subject to public 
consultation in March 2020: see Law 4548/2018 ‘Reform of the law of Sociétés Anonymes’, Government 
Gazette Vol. A, No. 104/June 13, 2018. For information on the national transposition measures see: https 
://eur-lex.europ a.eu/legal -conte nt/EN/NIM/?uri=CELEX :32017 L0828 . Accessed 6 April 2020.
126 Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der zweiten Aktionärsrechterichtlinie (ARUG II): sec-
tion 134b.
127 Νόμος 4706/2020 Εταιρική διακυβέρνηση ανωνύμων εταιρειών, σύγχρονη αγορά κεφαλαίου, 
ενσωμάτωση στην ελληνική νομοθεσία της Οδηγίας (ΕΕ) 2017/828 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και 
του Συμβουλίου, μέτρα προς εφαρμογή του Κανονισμού (ΕΕ) 2017/1131 και άλλες διατάξεις: Art. 32.
128 Loi du 1er août 2019 modifiant la loi modifiée du 24 mai 2011 concernant l’exercice de certains 
droits des actionnaires aux assemblées générales de sociétés cotées aux fins de transposer la directive 
(UE) 2017/828 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 17 mai 2017 modifiant la directive 2007/36/CE 
en vue de promouvoir l’engagement à long terme des actionnaires: Art.  1er sexies.
129 Anteprojeto de diploma de transposição da diretiva relativa ao exercício de certos direitos dos 
acionistas de sociedades cotadas, no que se refere aos incentivos ao envolvimento dos acionistas a longo 
prazo: Art. 251.° B.
130 Art. 3g has been transposed into a number of laws in Sweden: ‘Lagen om tryggande av pensionsut-
fästelse m.m. (1967:531)’ 10 e §–10 h §  ; ‘Lagen om värdepappersfonder (2004:46)’, 17 h §–17 k §; 
‘Lagen om värdepappersmarknaden (2007:528)’, 20 a §–20 d §; ‘Försäkringsrörelselagen (2010:2043)’, 
13 a §–13 d §; ‘Lagen om förvaltare av alternativa investeringsfonder (2013:561)’, 27 a §–8 d §.
131 Anteproyecto de Ley por la que se modifica el texto refundido de la Ley de Sociedades de Capital, 
aprobado por el Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2010, de 2 de julio, y otras normas financieras, para adap-
tarlas a la Directiva (UE) 2017/828 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 17 de mayo de 2017, por 
la que se modifica la Directiva 2007/36/CE en lo que respecta al fomento de la implicación a largo plazo 
de los accionistas: Arts. 67 bis and 79 bis.
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literal transposer of the SRD II provisions opting for what it calls a ‘faithful’ trans-
position of a minimum harmonization directive.132 While a literal transposition can 
imply a high degree of compliance with EU policies, in the context of shareholder 
stewardship one may question the degree of fit or ‘misfit’133 between the SRD II 
rules and existing national soft or hard laws, market structures and cultural tradi-
tions. It is therefore surprising that the same literal implementation was followed 
even by Member States with pre-SRD hard-law provisions that imposed more oner-
ous transparency requirements on institutional investors. For instance, France ripped 
off the previous requirement for asset managers to justify to institutional sharehold-
ers the reasons for which they had decided not to exercise their voting rights. The 
current version of this article has now removed this additional requirement incor-
porating a literal and minimalistic transposition of Article 3g (SRD II) and speci-
fying that the details of disclosure items will be provided by a decree by the Con-
seil d’État.134 It will thus be interesting to see if this tighter pre-SRD II domestic 
requirement will be permanently removed despite the discretion of Member States 
to go beyond the necessary minimum standards.
A literal transposition of the SRD II shareholder stewardship requirements has 
taken place even in Member States with pre-existing soft-law stewardship codes, 
such as in The Netherlands135 and Italy.136 In Denmark Article 3g was also trans-
posed in a literal and minimalistic way despite the slightly wider scope of the Dan-
ish transposition rules which also apply to some sui generis Danish funds.137
Finally, in the UK the transposition of Article 3g has been bifurcated on the basis 
of the nature of the regulatees. For asset managers and insurers, the Financial Con-
duct Authority (FCA), the responsible authority for the implementation of the rele-
vant SRD II provisions, chose to copy paste Article 3g, with the only distinctiveness 
132 Proposition de loi portant transposition de la directive (UE) 2017/828 du Parlement européen et 
du Conseil du 17 mai 2017 modifiant la directive 2007/36/CE en vue de promouvoir l’engagement à 
long terme des actionnaires, et portant des dispositions en matière de société et d’association: Session 
extraordinaire, Chambre des représentants de Belgique, 4 October 2019, DOC 55 0553/001, 5.
133 On the concept of ‘misfit’ or ‘adaptational pressure’ in transposing EU directives, see e.g. Treib 
(2003).
134 See Art. L.533-22 Code monétaire et financier prior to the SRD transposition (Loi n° 2019-486 du 
22 mai 2019 relative à la croissance et la transformation des entreprises, Loi PACTE).
135 Wijziging van Boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek, de Wet op het financieel toezicht en de Wet giraal 
effectenverkeer ter uitvoering van Richtlijn 2017/828/EU van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 
17 mei 2017 tot wijziging van Richtlijn 2007/36/EG wat het bevorderen van de langetermijnbetrokken-
heid van aandeelhouders betreft (PbEU 2017, L 132): Art. 5:87c and 5:87d.
136 Decreto Legislativo 10 maggio 2019, n. 49: Attuazione della direttiva 2017/828 del Parlamento 
europeo e del Consiglio, del 17 maggio 2017, che modifica la direttiva 2007/36/CE per quanto riguarda 
l’incoraggiamento dell’impegno a lungo termine degli azionisti: Art. 124-quinquies.
137 See Lov nr. 369 af 09/04/2019 om ændring af selskabsloven, lov om kapitalmarkeder, lov om finan-
siel virksomhed og forskellige andre love (Gennemførelse af ændringer i aktionærrettighedsdirektivet om 
tilskyndelse til langsigtet aktivt ejerskab), § 3, No 3 and 4, § 4, No 3, § 5, No 2, § 6 No 2, § 7, No 1, and 
§ 8, No 1. On the wider scope of the Danish transposed rules, see Birkmose and Madsen (2021).
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being the expanded geographical scope of the UK transposed rules to investments in 
shares traded outside the EU.138 The FCA considers this non-prescriptive approach 
as providing flexibility to asset owners and asset managers139 to meet the steward-
ship requirements depending on their business models and investment mentalities.140 
For trustees and occupational pension schemes, the UK Pensions Regulator is the 
authority that transposed Article 3g of the SRD II by introducing new disclosure 
stewardship obligations in June 2019.141 These complement the regulations intro-
duced in 2018 to require pension trustees to set out in their Statements of Invest-
ment Principles (SIP) their policies on financially material considerations, including 
ESG, and the shareholder stewardship (including monitoring and voting) of scheme 
investments.142
Overall, we find that a literal and minimalistic transposition of Article 3g of the 
SRD II took place both in Member States with and without pre-existing steward-
ship codes. While such a literal transposition of EU directives is a frequent phenom-
enon,143 previous research has shown that where literal transposition takes place at 
the expense of a careful adaptation to the specific circumstances in each Member 
State, shortcomings in enforcement and application are common.144 In the specific 
context of shareholder stewardship, this literal and minimalistic transposition is 
likely to reduce the attractiveness of shareholder stewardship in the eyes of market 
actors. This is because asset owners (or institutional investors in the SRD II jargon) 
and asset managers will mostly focus on ensuring boilerplate compliance with the 
minimalistic and generic transposed rules in order to avoid liability. But before try-
ing to find a solution to this suboptimal regulatory outcome, let us consider some 
explanations for this apparent ‘transposition puzzle’.
3.2  In Search of Transposition Rationales
The literal, minimalistic and a-contextual transposition of Article 3g runs counter to 
what would be predicted based on the foregoing elaboration of the legal, market and 
cultural specificities of national shareholder stewardship markets.145 It is also sur-
prising to see literal transposition trends in countries with pre-SRD II soft steward-
ship codes or preliminary stewardship initiatives, which create excellent conditions 
138 For UK insurers and reinsurers, see Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls 
(SYSV) sourcebook 3.4 SRD Requirements. For UK asset managers, see Conduct of Business Source-
book (COBS) 2.2B SRD requirements.
139 Meaning MIFID investment firms, alternative investment fund managers (AIFMs) (excluding small 
AIFMs), UCITS management companies, self-managed UCITS funds and FCA-regulated insurers.
140 FCA (2019), p 10.
141 The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment and Disclosure) (Amendment) Regulations 2019.
142 The Pension Protection Fund (Pensionable Service) and Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment 
and Disclosure) (Amendment and Modification) Regulations 2018. On the stewardship framework in the 
UK, see Katelouzou (2021).
143 See e.g. Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2007).
144 Falkner and Treib (2008).
145 See Sect. 2.3 above.
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for a tailored adaptation of EU policy to domestic circumstances. Leaving aside the 
general problems associated with the delayed and highly routinized transposition of 
EU directives,146 we identify several reasons for this trend.
First, Article 3g juridifies new normative features of shareholder stewardship 
obligations with which most of the Member States are not familiar. The require-
ment of developing and implementing an engagement policy is not something with 
which national regulatory authorities and regulatees are instinctively familiar. This 
argument is reinforced if one examines the transposition of other SRD II provisions. 
Unlike the stewardship-related engagement and disclosure provisions, the transposi-
tion of the more familiar SRD II rules relating to ‘say on pay’ or related party trans-
actions has been tailored at the national level in a way that depicts the idiosyncrasies 
and features of different company law traditions.147 Research on EC implementation 
has identified the degree of institutional and policy fit or misfit between EU harmo-
nized rules and existing, national institutional and regulatory features as one of the 
central factors that determine the implementation success.148 Here, there is a related 
argument about path dependence and the lock-in effects or ‘stickiness’ of pre-exist-
ing norms which create formidable pressures for continuity.149 If one applies this 
argument of pre-existing national institutions, norms and rules that persist change 
in the context of SRD II, then it becomes clear that Member States should cus-
tomize rather than copy harmonized rules that relate to issues closely attached to 
their respective legal traditions or that have been traditionally subject to hard (and 
maybe soft) law at the national level to allow for the continuity of the differentiat-
ing national rules.150 To put it in another way, the more outlandish the harmonized 
rule is, as is the case with the stewardship-related provisions of the SRD II, the less 
likely the tailored transposition will be.
Another reason explaining the literal and minimalistic transposition of Article 
3g is the lack of a strong market demand for shareholder stewardship in Europe.151 
Despite the increasing institutionalisation of public equity across Europe, ownership 
differences persist. A characteristic example is Germany where the market demand 
for stewardship from local institutional investors is not as strong as in the UK. It 
is well documented that German public equity, long seen as being dominated by 
146 See e.g. Berglund, Gange and Van Waarden (2006).
147 For instance, the highly contentious issue of ‘say on pay’ that, similar to stewardship, is dependent 
on national legal traditions, has allowed room for tailored transposition with various options offered by 
Art. 9a and 9b SRD II. Some Member States (France) provide for a binding shareholder vote on both the 
remuneration policy and report, others (the UK, Poland, Romania and Spain) provide for a binding vote 
on the remuneration policy and an advisory one on the remuneration report, and still others (Austria, 
Belgium, Germany and Finland) provide for an advisory one on both matters.
148 For an overview of this literature, see Falkner et al. (2005), pp 15-17.
149 The literature here is voluminous. See, among others, DiMaggio and Powell (1991); Fligstein and 
Freeland (1995); Klausner (1995); Bebchuk and Roe (1999).
150 This is evident in the area of related party transactions (RPTs). Here some Member States have main-
tained their own legal traditions in their entirety making use of the various flexibility safeguards being 
provided by Art. 9c SRD II. This flexibility was the outcome of a compromise, following the Commis-
sion’s initial proposals that were considerably stricter. For an overview, see Enriques and Tröger (2018).
151 Further on the demand side of stewardship see Katelouzou and Micheler (2021).
224 D. Katelouzou, K. Sergakis 
123
German blockholders, has been increasingly institutionalized over the past 20 years 
mainly due to the advent of foreign investors.152 While this institutionalization may 
increase the demand for stewardship in the future (especially from foreign investors) 
and trigger the development of soft stewardship initiatives, at present local play-
ers, such as German pension funds, are not as developed as in other countries and 
therefore a demand for shareholder stewardship from German investors is lacking.153 
This may explain why there is no appetite for a tailored transposition of the SRD II 
in Germany. Also, institutional investors vary widely in their ability to evaluate the 
performance of their asset manager in terms of stewardship activities. In the UK, for 
instance, despite the efforts by the FCA to strengthen investors’ stewardship capabil-
ity, institutional investors are still not taking their stewardship obligations seriously 
enough.154 Investor stewardship abilities and capacities are even less in other Mem-
ber States with no pre-SRD II stewardship norms (such as Germany). Another issue 
affecting the demand side of stewardship is the compatibility of the duties (often 
fiduciary in nature) that institutional investors, particularly pension trustees, owe 
to their beneficiaries. There has been much debate in recent years over the extent 
to which such duties require investors to maximize investment returns.155 In some 
countries, such as the UK, it is now clear that ESG considerations and stewardship 
are permissible.156 But in other countries, this debate is still unresolved.157 To all 
these, one needs to add that benefits from stewardship activities are not easily quan-
tified.158 This weakens even further the demand for shareholder stewardship. On the 
lack of such a demand at the national level, there are no lower-level (market) actors, 
such as institutional investors or their associations, to lobby for customized rules or 
even resist the literal adoption of the SRD II stewardship-related provisions.159
Finally, the literal and minimalistic transposition trend can be explained in light 
of the acknowledgement that more flexible tools, such as stewardship codes or other 
related principles, may be better suited to inculcate shareholder stewardship prac-
tices to which the next section is devoted.
152 For data, see De La Cruz, Medina and Tang (2019).
153 Ringe (2020).
154 See e.g. Tilba and Reisberg who provide evidence that only a few occupational (local) authority pen-
sion funds in the UK have realised the aspirations of investor stewardship and engagement: Tilba and 
Reisberg (2019).
155 See e.g. Sandberg (2013).
156 Katelouzou (2021).
157 PRI and others’ Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century (2019), https ://www.unepfi .org/wordp ress/wp-
conte nt/uploa ds/2019/10/Fiduc iary-duty-21st-centu ry-final -repor t.pdf. Accessed 31 March 2020.
158 On the mixed evidence in relation to the financial benefits of stewardship see Katelouzou and 
Micheler (2021).
159 On the role of institutional ‘veto players’ see generally Tsebelis (2002).
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4  The Enduring Importance of National Stewardship Codes 
or Principles/Guidelines
4.1  The Benefits of Stewardship Codes: Flexibility, Compliance, Legitimacy 
and Signalling
The attributes of soft law, including its non-binding character, flexibility and gradual 
nudging capacity towards meaningful compliance, are well discussed.160 Steward-
ship codes or principles/guidelines have all these features, but in addition they apply 
to investors (signatories) that voluntarily regard stewardship as compatible with 
their investment management practices. This is an additional attractiveness point for 
stewardship codes (as compared with corporate governance codes, for instance) as 
they can stimulate compliance not only from domestic market actors but also from 
foreign ones; indeed, foreign actors may want to become signatory parties of such 
initiatives for reputational purposes and to signal their proximity to a specific local 
market and clients for the expansion of their activities and clientele. By contrast, 
the SRD II applies to all the institutional investors and asset managers as defined 
in Article 1(2)(e) SRD II and this has been transposed in national regimes, and not 
only to signatory parties. Also, the requirement to develop, disclose and implement 
an engagement policy under the transposed SRD II rules even though it operates 
on a comply-or-explain basis, it still has strong coerciveness: the regulatees have to 
comply or explain with regard to the transposed national rule.161 Both features point 
out the stronger SRD II presumption with regard to the relevance of shareholder 
engagement for investment management.162 By contrast, soft stewardship codes and 
principles/guidelines by offering flexibility and malleability in the shaping of their 
content and expectations from signatory parties can promote tailored stewardship 
practices and inculcate stewardship to national frameworks that have not progressed 
significantly in that area or have not witnessed an institutionalized effort to shape 
stewardship norms.
Second, national soft-law stewardship initiatives have increased the familiarity 
of market actors with stewardship practices and in some cases their awareness and 
compliance readiness with regard to the SRD II stewardship-related rules. Indeed, 
anecdotal evidence on the disclosure practices of signatory parties to national stew-
ardship codes reveal that they have been more familiarized with the SRD II trans-
posed rules, while remaining open to additional levels of transparency that derive 
from their adherence to national codes or principles.163 A recent survey of European 
160 See e.g. Sergakis (2013).
161 See also Sect. 2.1 above.
162 See also Chiu and Katelouzou (2017).
163 See, for instance, the engagement policy statement of Lazard Asset Management, a signatory to the 
UK Stewardship Code, https ://www.lazar dasse tmana gemen t.com/docs/-m0-/88455 /SRDII Engag ement 
Polic y_en.pdf. Accessed 4 December 2019. Also see the statement from the Danish Corporate Gov-
ernance Committee highlighting the beneficial impact of the Danish Stewardship Code on the gradual 
familiarity that investors gained with the transposed SRD II rules: https ://corpo rateg overn ance.dk/udfas 
ning-af-anbef aling er-aktiv t-ejers kab. Accessed 24 February 2020.
226 D. Katelouzou, K. Sergakis 
123
institutional investors’ awareness and readiness for the SRD II by Hermes found that 
79% of the Dutch investors surveyed were aware of the SRD II as opposed to 42% in 
Spain.164 The survey also reported that Spain has the lowest understanding and com-
pliance readiness of any country studied pointing to the lack of a stewardship code 
in place.165 Yet, the relationship between the pre-existence of national stewardship 
codes, on the one hand, and the awareness of and compliance readiness with regard 
to the SRD II stewardship-related rules, on the other, is not a linear one and notable 
exceptions exist. For instance, Italian institutional investors are reported as having 
low awareness and compliance readiness with regard to the SRD II despite the pres-
ence of stewardship principles directed to asset managers since 2016.166 This may be 
regarded as confounding the positive attributes of soft stewardship codes, but market 
and cultural traits can explain, to some degree, the Italian case. While there has been 
a growing interest in voting in recent years, Italian investors tend to disregard long-
term shareholder engagement and shareholder stewardship as an investment tool.167 
It is also noteworthy that the limited scope of the Italian code, which applies only 
to asset managers (and not to institutional investors), may also explain why Italian 
investors appear to be less familiar with and less compliance-ready to apply the SRD 
II stewardship-related tools.168 Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the national 
demand for soft-law initiatives is currently shifting in Italy: in 2020, three institu-
tional investors (Inarcassa, Cassa Forense and Enpam) formed the Association of 
Responsible Investors (Assodire) with the aim, inter alia, of defining a best practice 
policy for their members and issuing a judgement so as to align shareholder steward-
ship activities with such policy. Assodire is also open to more institutional inves-
tors who may want to join this voluntary initiative. During the same period, various 
Italian institutional investors announced the formation of a similar network so as 
to better exercise their shareholder stewardship activities and to aspire to their own 
high standards via the increase of awareness, research studies, training courses and 
assistance to institutional investors in their activities.169
While the potential of stewardship codes and similar principles/guidelines to 
promote familiarity and compliance with shareholder stewardship norms and rules 
surely depends on their scope and traction in national contexts, other stewardship 
norm setters (public or quasi-public authorities, industry associations etc.) have a 




167 Ibid. See also Strampelli (2021).
168 For instance, some institutional investors have been focusing primarily on complying with IORPs’ 
rules (provided by Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
December 2016 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision 
(IORPs) [2016] OJ L 354/37) demonstrating thus a much lower degree of awareness of SRD II rules. 
‘Engagement fondi, frenato dal mandato’, Etica News, 19 March 2020.
169 See for example, the ‘Centro di tutela dei diritti degli azionisti istituzionali’ created by Associazione 
Italiana per la Previdenza Complementare (Assoprevidenza) in collaboration with the Consiglio Nazion-
ale dei Dottori Commercialisti e degli Esperti Contabili (CNDCEC), available at https ://assop revid enza.
it/chi-siamo /.
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best practices and the achievement of high shareholder stewardship standards.170 
At the transnational level, the EFAMA Stewardship Code171 and the International 
Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) Global Stewardship Principles172 provide, 
respectively, EU and international outlooks in relation to market expectations on 
best shareholder stewardship practices. But while the EFAMA code aims to serve 
as ‘a European reference document’ for asset managers seeking to comply with the 
SRD II stewardship-related provisions, national stewardship norms are better suited 
to support institutional investors and asset managers aiming to comply more mean-
ingfully with the transposed SRD II provisions as they are more sensitive to local-
ized legal, market and cultural traits.
Third, there is a legitimacy argument in favour of the preservation and develop-
ment of soft stewardship codes and similar initiatives. By facilitating compliance 
with the SRD II-related stewardship rules, national soft stewardship codes can help 
institutional investors to seek legitimacy from both (quasi-)public regulators and 
other markets actors. In other words, the transposed rules, similar to soft-law stew-
ardship codes, promote interaction between market actors within the investment 
chain as well as between these actors and society (ranging from the ultimate ben-
eficiaries to various stakeholders affected by the corporate economy).173 By oblig-
ing such actors to disclose their engagement policies and investment practices, the 
transposed SRD II rules inadvertently create a ‘neo-institutional’ dimension that 
drives investors towards the need to acquire legitimacy within society,174 looking 
beyond rational economic behaviour that only relates to their profits. But the literal 
and minimalistic transposition of the SRD II stewardship-related rules is likely to 
have a knock-on effect on these legitimacy attributes. This is because the informa-
tional quality of the shareholder engagement statements imposed by the SRD II is 
expected to be poor following the literal and minimalistic transposition of the SRD 
II stewardship-related rules. Market actors, therefore, will endeavour to discover 
more meaningful (and sometimes additional) information arising from disclosures 
triggered by soft-law stewardship tools that often add informational elements that 
go beyond the SRD II, as is the case with the 2020 version of the UK Steward-
ship Code which puts an increasing emphasis on ESG factors and stewardship out-
comes.175 This is why market actors support the introduction of post-SRD II stew-
ardship codes, in countries such as Germany, so as to fill implementation gaps and 
to entice investors to produce more detailed policy statements and to avoid cursory 
170 As is the case in Finland and Sweden: see Fenwick and Vermeulen (2018), p 33.
171 EFAMA, ‘Stewardship Code: Principles for Asset Managers’ Monitoring of, Voting in, Engagement 
with Investee Companies’, https ://www.efama .org/Publi catio ns/Publi c/Corpo rate_Gover nance /EFAMA 
%20Ste wards hip%20Cod e.pdf. Accessed 7 April 2020.
172 See https ://www.icgn.org/sites /defau lt/files /ICGNG lobal Stewa rdshi pPrin ciple s.pdf. Accessed 7 April 
2020.
173 Möslein and Sørensen (2018).
174 On the concept of legitimacy in this framework, see Scott (2001b).
175 Of course, this does not necessarily suggest that the information quality of the statements to national 
stewardship codes will always be superior in quality compared to the information generated by SRD II-
related disclosures. On the disclosure quality of the statements of the signatories to the UK Stewardship 
Code, see Katelouzou (2021).
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reporting.176 Having the unique capacity to go beyond a formalistic compliance with 
the literally transposed SRD II rules, soft stewardship codes and similar initiatives 
can provide distinctive benefits for signatory parties to become more open and dis-
cursive towards other actors through their stewardship statements. Additionally, this 
auxiliary informational exposure is safeguarded in its flexibility and malleability in 
the absence of formal public sanctions, contrary to what is provided as an option by 
Article 14b of the SRD II.177
Finally, adherence to soft-law stewardship codes may strengthen the signalling 
effect that stewardship statements produced in compliance with Article 3g of the 
SRD II have on ultimate beneficiaries, other investors and boards of investee com-
panies,178 and stimulate the demand side of the stewardship market.179 For instance, 
ultimate beneficiaries have become increasingly interested in responsible, long-term 
investment and the impact of the adopted stewardship strategy, such as engagement, 
upon the investment portfolio. The information contained in shareholder steward-
ship statements, especially when a single statement is used to comply with both soft 
and hard-law stewardship norms,180 often goes beyond the items provided by Article 
3g of the SRD II and can therefore amplify the signalling effect of stewardship to 
the market. This should gradually increase the incentives of institutional investors to 
become signatory parties of a stewardship code or set of principles/guidelines and 
reap reputational benefits. Other investors can also use the disclosed information 
generated by stewardship codes to distinguish engagement strategies that contribute 
to the improvement of corporate governance from others that have a more short-
term focus. This is especially important in the context of activist campaigns when 
the support of fellow investors is sought by activist funds that aim to collectively 
change corporate governance matters in investee companies.181 Boards of directors 
can also find the information contained in stewardship statements useful when they 
engage with investors as adherence to stewardship codes can entice them towards a 
greater availability to initiate dialogue so as to clarify a series of issues.182
A final point to be raised is that different soft stewardship instruments from dif-
ferent issuers and different content may present their own advantages for different 
purposes. For instance, some codes can allow a more targeted focus on the achieve-
ment of specific outcomes within the national context. Take, for instance, the exam-
ples of the Swiss or Norwegian codes, which focus solely on shareholder voting 
and investment management, respectively, or the Italian code which only applies 
to Italian asset managers. Such codes, better described as preliminary stewardship 
176 Hermes (2019), p 4.
177 Art. 14b of the SRD II enables Member States to provide for effective proportionate and dissuasive 
measures and penalties for violations of its transposed provisions into national law. On this issue, see 
Katelouzou and Sergakis (2020).
178 Alvaro, Maugeri and Strampelli (2019), p 58.
179 Katelouzou (2021).
180 See the text accompanying n. 215 below.
181 On collective shareholder engagement, see e.g. Micheler (2013); Katelouzou (2021).
182 Alvaro, Maugeri and Strampelli (2019), p 59.
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initiatives,183 despite their limited nature can still instil a common denominator 
of shareholder stewardship in frameworks that are still in their infancy or are still 
indecisive about the regulatory approach that needs to be adopted. If such initia-
tives are seen as a ‘normative laboratory’ that is able to inaugurate a basic—yet ini-
tially static—framework, they may well prepare the ground for the multiplication of 
more ‘extended’ stewardship codes at the national level184 or even a gradual transi-
tion to the latter.185 While there is only some very limited evidence on the impact of 
pre-SRD II stewardship norms on investment practices,186 preserving and evolving 
stewardship codes or principles as well as multiplying such soft-law norms across 
the EU will support the functionality of the wider ‘symbiosis’ with the harmonized 
rules.
4.2  An Emerging Symbiosis of SRD II Rules and Soft Law Norms
We have already seen that shareholder stewardship norms occupy a highly complex 
and interconnected regulatory space—or better ‘spaces’187—dominated by various 
public, quasi-public and market actors. In Member States with pre-existing steward-
ship codes, public or quasi-public authorities, investor associations or other private 
groups have already been influential in shaping stewardship norms and practices. 
With the transposition of SRD II, the engagement and disclosure elements of share-
holder stewardship have been juridified and have moved away from a purely self-reg-
ulatory environment.188 As a result, in Member States with pre-SRD II stewardship 
norms we are already witnessing a progressive symbiosis of the transposed SRD II 
rules with domestic soft law instruments. In this section we support the expansion of 
such a symbiotic relationship across the EU advancing the claim that soft-law codes 
or principles are innovative norm-generating mechanisms.
Starting with the UK, the FCA and the FRC (a quasi-public agency responsible 
for the UK Stewardship Code)189 have engaged in joint-up policy thinking on stew-
ardship following the enactment of SRD II.190 The current shareholder stewardship 
regulatory framework in the UK features the transposed (by the FCA and Pension 
Regulator) rules as the minimum regulatory baseline for shareholder stewardship 
183 Katelouzou and Siems (2021).
184 For example, the EFAMA Code has already influenced the creation of national codes in the EU and 
may continue to do so in other Member States, while purporting to serve as an auxiliary tool for market 
actors to comply with different national codes.
185 This gradual evolution of stewardship codes is part of the general evolution of legal norms. For an 
application of systems theory and new institutional approaches within corporate governance, see gener-
ally Deakin and Carvalho (2011).
186 Becht, Franks and Wagner (2019) (using proprietary data to study the investment stewardship prac-
tices of Aberdeen Standard Investments, a UK-active asset manager).
187 On the multiple regulatory spaces or political economies of corporate law production, see Katelou-
zou and Zumbansen (2020).
188 On the juridification or legalization of stewardship, see Chiu and Katelouzou (2017), p 143.
189 In 2020, the FRC will be replaced by the Audit, Reporting and Governance Authority (ARGA) which 
will be a public body.
190 FRC/FCA (2019).
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actions, with the 2020 version of the UK Stewardship Code promoting higher stew-
ardship standards that go beyond the minimum SRD II rules.191 The FCA explicitly 
recognises the role of other stewardship norm-setters and allows regulatory space 
for industry participants, such as investors’ associations, or other stakeholders to 
develop additional guidance to aid interpretation and promote the comparability of 
stewardship disclosures.192 The need for such a coordinated industry approach has 
been emphasized in the case of voting disclosures.193
Another sign of innovation in the development of soft-law norms is the expansion 
of the stewardship-related regulatory agenda in the UK. While the original rationale 
behind the introduction of shareholder stewardship in the UK was mostly related to 
the financial crisis, ‘absentee landlords’ and blatant corporate governance failures, 
the revised 2020 stewardship code shows elements of a gradual detachment from 
such law-and-economics arguments and a gradual embracing of overarching public 
priorities related to the shaping of a sustainable-focused stewardship framework.194 
The evolution of the UK stewardship principles from the preliminary Institutional 
Shareholders’ Committee (ISC) 1991 statement to the 2020 FRC code demonstrates 
that the continuous interaction of market actors with constantly evolving soft-law 
norms will not simply increase familiarity and compliance with the harmonized 
SRD II rules but will, most importantly, allow for the overall improvement of stew-
ardship standards and practices.195 But we need to acknowledge that the UK benefits 
from a market infrastructure that has traditionally favoured openness to foreign capi-
tal and market actors, thereby providing a highly prolific framework for the emer-
gence and furtherance of market-driven initiatives in the area of shareholder stew-
ardship. The same levels of stewardship demand and market infrastructure, as we 
have seen above, are largely absent in other Member States that seem to be resisting 
the idea of introducing soft stewardship codes or principles/guidelines within their 
national framework.196
Signs of a fruitful symbiosis and normative innovation can also be found in Italy. 
In the public consultation launched by the CONSOB (the Italian public authority for 
regulating securities markets and in charge of implementing and enforcing the trans-
posed SRD II rules) for the implementation of the SRD II, the role of Assogestioni, 
the representative association of Italian asset managers and the issuer of the Italian 
Stewardship Code, has been accredited as the normative precursor to the transposed 
SRD II rules and as a key factor facilitating compliance without subjecting the reg-
ulatees to a significant increase in compliance burdens and costs.197 Most impor-
tantly, the Società per lo sviluppo del Mercato dei Fondi Pensione (Mefop Spa),198 
191 See also Sect. 2.2 above.
192 FCA (2019), p 14.
193 Ibid.
194 This has been described as a movement towards ‘enlightened stewardship’. See further Katelouzou 
(2021).
195 Ibid.
196 See Sect. 2.3 above.
197 CONSOB (2019), p 31.
198 See https ://www.mefop .it/site/chi-siamo /chi-siamo . Accessed 24 February 2020.
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a company founded by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (which still 
remains its majority shareholder) and capital participation by various asset owners 
(e.g. pension funds, insurance companies etc.) with the aim being to develop welfare 
means via research, interpretation and the communication of welfare norms, aims to 
occupy some regulatory space in a symbiotic relationship with the SRD II rules. In 
March 2020, Mefop sent a questionnaire to its members to gauge the levels of aware-
ness concerning the SRD II stewardship-related rules.199 In October 2020,200 Mefop 
shared with its members the opportunity to create a set of stewardship guidelines. In 
contrast with most stewardship codes or principles across the globe,201 the envisaged 
guidelines will not require any commitment in terms of adherence and are aimed to 
function as a common reference point which will increase dialogue between insti-
tutional investors and investee companies, increase the awareness of SRD II stew-
ardship-related rules, educate Italian institutional investors and fill the gap left by 
the Assogestioni’s stewardship code. The proposed multiplication of soft-law stew-
ardship norms in Italy by Mefop is reflective of the malleable character of soft-law 
stewardship initiatives that aim to help market actors to better absorb top-down reg-
ulation, such as the SRD II rules, and guide them towards meaningful compliance 
and higher levels of stewardship practices. Such initiatives are even more important 
when top-down regulation is not customized to national circumstances, as is the case 
with the SRD II transposed rules. We should thus see such innovation as an example 
that needs to be followed across the EU.
Another interesting case of a symbiotic relationship between national stewardship 
norms and the transposed SRD II stewardship-related rules is the Dutch Steward-
ship Code which was revised in 2018 following the transposition of the SRD II. The 
Dutch code is the only stewardship code so far that makes direct references to the 
SRD II. The preamble to the Dutch code is indicative of its multi-level normative 
nature. The code: (1) ‘builds and supersedes’ the 2011 stewardship code; (2) ‘incor-
porates’ the semi-hard stewardship obligations for asset owners and asset managers 
stemming from Article 3g of the SRD II; (3) ‘incorporates the best practices of the 
Dutch Corporate Governance Code that apply to asset owners and asset managers’; 
and (4) ‘contains a number of additional principles as a result of evolving steward-
ship expectations’.202 Importantly, principle 1 of the Dutch code (which incorporates 
Article 3g of the SRD II) chooses the term ‘stewardship policy’, rather than ‘engage-
ment policy’ that is used in the SRD II.203 This is because ‘engagement’ is consid-
ered to be only a facet of the broader concept of stewardship.204 The Dutch code also 
extends beyond the SRD II and includes principles relating to communication with 
relevant stakeholders (Principle 5) or borrowing and lending shares (Principle 11).
199 ‘Mefop studia un Stewardship Code per la previdenza’, Etica News, 5 March 2020.
200 Mefop, Tavolo di lavoro ‘Investitori previdenziali alla prova della Direttiva Shareholder Rights II’, 1 
October 2020.
201 Further on stewardship enforcement, see Katelouzou and Sergakis (2020).
202 Dutch Code, p 2.
203 Dutch Code p 6.
204 Dutch Code, p 7. See also Katelouzou (2021).
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While in the UK, Italy and the Netherlands we have seen signs of a fruitful sym-
biosis between soft national stewardship norms and the transposed SRD II stew-
ardship-related rules, Denmark has taken the perhaps surprising decision to abol-
ish pre-existing soft-law norms on the transposition of SRD II rules. On 28 January 
2020, the Danish Committee on Corporate Governance announced, in agreement 
with the Minister of Business Affairs, that it will discontinue the applicability of the 
Danish Stewardship Code. The Committee recognized the beneficial role that the 
Danish code has played so far in preparing market actors to follow the transposed 
SRD II rules and ensuring openness on how institutional investors manage assets. 
But the Committee considered that there is now an overlap between the semi-hard 
obligations set forward by the SRD II and the soft Danish code and, therefore, it 
decided to abolish the code.205 It is interesting to note that the Danish code was 
introduced whilst the SRD II was imminent and the Danish Committee foresaw that 
the implementation of the SRD II could overlap with the soft stewardship frame-
work.206 Indeed, the scope of the Danish Code and the transposed rules is almost 
identical—with the exception of some sui generis Danish investors.207 In terms 
of content, all principles of the Danish code, apart from Principle 3 on escalating 
activity, are now found in the transposition framework. Birkmose and Madsen have 
argued that escalation is an ‘implicit part of shareholder engagement’ and should 
therefore be reflected in future policies on active ownership required by the Danish 
transposed rules despite that lack of a specific reference.208 To that one can add that 
the escalation principle has been the least well-perceived principle of the inaugural 
UK Stewardship Code,209 and is not incorporated in Article 3g of the SRD II.
But what does the Danish example tell us about the future of soft shareholder 
stewardship norms? We find the marginalisation of soft-law norms, as is the case 
in Denmark, to be a regulatory faux pas for the following reasons. By depriving the 
market of a soft stewardship code, institutional investors and asset managers will 
have less—if no—guidance about what should be included in the engagement pol-
icies provided by the SRD II. Indeed, the norm-setters of soft stewardship codes 
have a unique capacity—due to their proximity to and experience of the market—to 
develop and maintain an ongoing dialogue with the regulatees, and thereby to nudge 
and guide actors towards meaningful compliance. Moreover, in the absence of a soft 
stewardship code or related principles/guidelines, market actors will depend on a 
future revision of the SRD II rules to see any evolution or amendments applicable 
to their shareholder stewardship obligations. Such a revision may take longer than 
the much more frequent revision of soft-law norms that can depict new challenges 
or changes in the investment management models affecting stewardship practices. 
Lastly, the obligation to comply with the literal and minimalistic SRD II rules, in the 
205 Corporate Governance, ‘Udfasning af Anbefalinger for aktivt Ejerskab’, 28 January 2020, https ://
corpo rateg overn ance.dk/udfas ning-af-anbef aling er-aktiv t-ejers kab. Accessed 24 February 2020.
206 Birkmose and Madsen (2021).
207 See also Sect. 2.2 above.
208 Birkmose and Madsen (2021).
209 For empirical evidence on the relatively limited diffusion of this principle, see Katelouzou and Siems 
(2021).
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absence of accompanying tailored soft stewardship norms, will accentuate meaning-
less compliance trends since market actors will not have a flexible point of refer-
ence to disclose their strategies but will be conscious of the perils of coming across 
as non-compliant in a strict framework and hence reluctant to be more transparent. 
Birkmose and Madsen are optimistic, however, and argue that this abolition is not 
synonymous with the ‘culmination of Danish stewardship’.210 Rather, they suggest 
that evolution can come from the incorporation of soft stewardship-related obliga-
tions in the Danish Corporate Governance Code, such as a duty by the board of 
directors to engage with institutional shareholders.211 Irrespective of whether stew-
ardship-related norms will operate through the means of a standalone stewardship 
code, a corporate governance code or any other standards, guidelines, rules, codes of 
best practices or codes of conduct, the key message is clear: soft law in the area of 
shareholder stewardship can nudge market actors towards higher standards of stew-
ardship and can act as a continuous driving force to promote compliance with the 
literal and minimalistic national rules that have transposed the SRD II.
This can provide food for thought and facilitate a debate on the merits of soft 
shareholder stewardship norms in Member States that have not created or testified 
to the development of soft law initiatives in the area of shareholder stewardship. 
Sweden is a representative example here. The Swedish Investment Fund Association 
revised its 2002 shareholder engagement guidelines for ‘fund management compa-
nies’ (asset managers) in May 2019, following the literal and minimalistic transpo-
sition of the SRD II rules.212 The guidelines specifically state that they ‘have been 
adapted to shareholder engagement legislation which […] implements’ the SRD 
II.213 The guidelines significantly expand the statutory requirements in relation to 
the content of the shareholder engagement policy adding the following principles: 
(1) ‘the fund management company’s principles regarding its own participation in 
the work of nomination committees’; (2) ‘how questions concerning inside informa-
tion are handled in relation to the shareholder engagement’; (3) ‘the situations in 
which the fund management company acts in the companies in which the fund owns 
shares, and the fund management company’s escalation procedures’; (4) whether 
voting advisers are used; (5) ‘the fund management company’s principles for stock 
lending and how they are applied in order to perform the engagement where appro-
priate, particularly at general meetings of the companies that have issued shares that 
are included in the fund’, and (6) ‘other principles applied by the fund management 
company that are of material significance for the shareholder engagement’.
The Swedish development of innovative shareholder stewardship guidelines 
confirms that national law can provide more tailored solutions to local contexts. 
In addition, the incorporation of such customized solutions in a soft code of con-
duct developed by a domestic investor association underscores the importance of 
210 Birkmose and Madsen (2021).
211 Ibid.
212 See https ://www.fondb olage n.se/globa lasse ts/regel verk/guide lines --code-of-condu ct/guide lines -for-
fund-manag ement -compa nies-share holde r-engag ement .pdf. Accessed 4 April 2020.
213 Ibid., p 2.
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market demand and local institutional investor support so as to ensure good stew-
ardship practices and support meaningful compliance with the SRD II transposed 
rules. Any future symbiotic relationship between soft stewardship codes or princi-
ples/guidelines and the transposed SRD II rules depends essentially upon the role 
of local investors’ associations. Such investor associations and other multi-stake-
holder and supranational forums214 can instil good shareholder stewardship prac-
tices through continuous dialogue amongst investors and standard setters and the 
shaping of collaborative activity pathways. Institutional investors that will actively 
invest resources, provide high-quality disclosure and meaningfully engage with asset 
managers will thus be of crucial importance in furthering the success of the national 
normative agenda.215
Overall, our analysis shows that the operability of the literal and minimalistic 
SRD II shareholder stewardship rules crucially depends on other soft stewardship 
norms (stewardship codes or principles/guidelines or any other related initiative 
included in corporate governance codes, best practice standards or codes of con-
duct) tailored to the specific national contexts. However, it needs to be acknowl-
edged that the symbiosis of multiple stewardship frameworks (especially when these 
do not entirely overlap) may create some confusion for institutional investors and 
asset managers that adhere to all of them. For instance, in the UK there is now a 
partial overlap between the disclosure requirements under the FCA’s Conduct of 
Business Sourcebook (COBS) that transposed Article 3g (SRD II) and reporting 
under the UK 2020 Stewardship Code. For instance, matters to be included in the 
engagement policy of COBS 2.2B.6 overlap with Principles 3, 9, 10 and 12 of the 
UK Stewardship Code which deal with conflicts of interests, engagement, collab-
oration with other investors and the exercise of shareholder rights, respectively.216 
However, there is no real clarity as to the interaction between the two. Indeed, the 
FCA provides no Handbook guidance or any other templates on how insurers and 
asset managers can implement the transposed requirements.217 The FCA, however, 
leaves open the option for asset managers to report in a single document to both 
the COBS disclosure and the UK Stewardship Code, and requests asset manag-
ers to consider whether the disclosures they provide under the code are sufficient 
to meet the reporting imposed under the transposed rules.218 But this is not a clear 
option in other Member States with pre-existing stewardship codes, such as Italy or 
214 See for example, the US Investor Stewardship Group (https ://isgfr amewo rk.org), the Japanese Insti-
tutional Investors Collective Engagement Forum (https ://www.iicef .jp/en/), the British Local Author-
ity Pension Fund Forum (https ://www.lapff orum.org) and the Council of Institutional Investors (https ://
www.cii.org). Similarly, see the role of EFAMA at the EU level that has already inspired the creation of 
national soft-law norms, such as the Italian Stewardship Principles.
215 See also Hermes (2018).
216 This overlap is recognised by the FCA itself. See FCA (2019), p 14.
217 On the implications of this overlap see, further, Katelouzou (2021).
218 FCA (2019), p 14. See e.g. Aberdeen Standard Investments Voting Rights Policy, which consists of 
a single statement for both the UK Stewardship Code and the SRD II transposed provisions due to the 
additional nudging of the UK code: https ://www.aberd eenst andar d.com/docs?editi onId=bfcb3 d9c-0a6e-
4e14-8eb2-26ee5 6d3a4 5d. Accessed 17 February 2020. Note that this statement was published in July 
2019 and this is why it refers to the 2012 version of the UK Stewardship Code.
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the Netherlands. Another key challenge for the symbiosis between the SRD II rules 
and soft shareholder stewardship norms lies in the collective shaping of a normative 
framework of ‘culturally compatible’219 stewardship at industry and national levels 
that acknowledges national traits while leaving space for both harmonized mini-
mum standards and tailored practices to be introduced to the stewardship market. 
Of course, a series of adaptation limits are present here. For Member States with 
no pre-SRD soft stewardship norms, such as Germany, cognitive problems arise in 
relation to their reticence to accept shareholder stewardship as something malleable 
and constantly evolving. For other Member States with pre-SRD norms, such as 
Italy, other cognitive limitations may exist, such as the preoccupation of institutional 
investors with a more conventional perception of governance challenges that does 
not fully acknowledge currently emerging trends (e.g. ESG factors). But with the 
SRD II having been transposed in a literal and minimalistic way, this stewardship 
nexus can only be materialized with the continuous support and promotion of soft, 
tailored stewardship initiatives that can offer customization and meaning to the SRD 
II rules, while a minimum harmonization of shareholder stewardship has already 
been secured.
5  Concluding Thoughts for an Optimal Symbiosis of Stewardship 
Norms
In this article, we provided an original account of the rationale, the dynamics and 
the evolution of the EU policy towards long-term shareholder engagement within 
(or in the absence of) nationally embedded frameworks within which the broader 
concept of shareholder stewardship is currently emerging. Our key aim was to deci-
pher the aspirations of the EU policy and the likelihood of its success. It was not 
our intention to deliver an all-encompassing analysis of the interaction between the 
SRD II transposed rules and the national legal frameworks. The complete image will 
only come into existence once market actors start implementing the semi-hard SRD 
II transposed rules or using them concomitantly with any pre-(or post-)SRD II soft-
law stewardship norms.
Two key points stand out from our analysis. First, we denote the rather formal-
istic approach that has been adopted in the transposition of Article 3g of the SRD 
II. Member States have largely copied the requirement for the development, disclo-
sure and implementation of an engagement policy on the part of institutional inves-
tors and asset managers without allowing for a tailored and more meaningful cus-
tomization according to national idiosyncrasies. Secondly, we highlight the positive 
attributes of soft shareholder stewardship norms, in terms of flexibility, enhanced 
familiarity and preparedness concerning the SRD II transposed rules, legitimacy and 
signalling as well as innovation, and on that basis we advocate the maintenance and 
multiplication of such soft-law norms. The proposed symbiotic shareholder steward-
ship framework, tailored to specific national circumstances, can offer market actors 
219 Licht (2004), p 232.
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an operational normative space that is discursive, flexible and customized to evolv-
ing shareholder stewardship norms and practices.
To paraphrase Věra Jourová’s statement: did we learn the lessons from the past? 
Unfortunately, the answer is: not very much. It is clear that the EU agenda focuses 
on responsible shareholder engagement, sustainable investment and long-term cor-
porate growth. These are laudable policy objectives. But the means of achieving 
them—via the minimalist SRD II engagement and disclosure duties and the ensuing 
literal transposed rules—are not enough. The SRD II transposition cannot lead on 
its own to tailored shareholder stewardship practices and efficient outcomes without 
supporting soft-law stewardship initiatives (stewardship codes or principles/guide-
lines or any other related initiative included in corporate governance codes, best 
practice standards or codes of conduct). Simply put, moving on from focusing on 
short-term financial gain is not a simple task that can be solved with a single legal 
parameter. Nor can the literal and minimalistic national rules that transpose the SRD 
II stewardship-related provisions promote shareholder stewardship in Europe with-
out any customization. Soft shareholder stewardship norms are therefore needed to 
go hand in hand with the transposed SRD II rules and support the emerging, but still 
to be concretely shaped, shareholder stewardship landscape.
Before we conclude it is important to emphasise that notwithstanding our cri-
tique on the literal transposition trends, we do not see this as necessarily subop-
timal. Rather we argue that the lack of customization by the Member States has 
surprisingly left existing or future soft shareholder stewardship norms with a rela-
tively large operational space (in terms of scope, content etc.), which is however 
not entirely autonomous. This is because soft-law shareholder stewardship can now 
operate to support and perhaps extend the minimum stewardship standards imposed 
by the transposed SRD II rules. On that basis, we argue that soft-law stewardship 
norms need to be multiplied across national markets so as to shape, together with the 
harmonized SRD II regime, a more flexible and tailored regulatory framework. The 
current examples of Italy and Sweden testify to the need to provide for experimental, 
less binding soft law tools to inculcate stewardship culture amongst investors and 
pave the way for more developments in this area. While much more must be done 
at the EU, national and industry level if we wish more fully to address the pressing 
challenges arising from the corporate governance role of institutional investors and 
asset managers, keeping the normative landscape diverse and open will surely help 
to promote shareholder stewardship in Europe.
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